This paper provides evidence of the causal effect of church attendance on petty crime by using quasi-random variation in the number of Sundays when it precipitated at the specific time of most religious services. Using a novel strategy, I find a narrow time window when most individuals attend church. Based on a panel between 1980 and 2016, I find that one more Sunday with precipitation at the time of church increases yearly drug-related, alcohol-related, and white-collar crimes. I do not find an effect for violent or property crimes. These effects are driven by more religious counties. Previous evidence showing negative effects of church attendance on the demand for alcohol and drugs is consistent with a demand-driven interpretation of the results presented.

The global increase in refugee flows and anti-migrant politics has made it increasingly urgent to understand how migration translates into anti-migrant sentiment. We study the mass exodus of Venezuelans across Latin America, which coincided with an unprecedented decrease in migrant sentiment in the countries which received the most Venezuelans. However, we find no evidence that this decrease occurred in the regions within-country that received the most migrants. We do this using multiple migrant sentiment outcomes including survey measures and social media posts, multiple levels of geographic variation across seven Latin American countries, and an instrumental variable strategy. We find little evidence for heterogeneity along a range of characteristics related to labor market competition, public good scarcity, or crime. If anything, local migration increases migrant sentiment among those most directly exposed to these pressures. We also find that local migration induces meaningful, repeated contact between migrants and natives. The results are consistent with anti-migrant sentiment being driven by national-level narratives divorced from local experiences with migrants.

This paper examines language patterns in US television news coverage of police killings. We first document that the media employ semantic structures that obfuscate responsibility—such as passive voice, nominalizations, and intransitive verbs—more frequently for police killings than for civilian killings. Using field variation and an online experiment, we demonstrate that these language differences matter. In the field, we find that people who happened to have taken a survey just after more obfuscatory coverage of a police killing are more likely to support police funding. In our online experiment, participants are less likely to hold police officers morally responsible and demand penalties when exposed to obfuscatory language, especially when the victim is unarmed. Returning to the news data, we find higher use of obfuscatory language when victims are unarmed, when video footage is available, or when the suspect is not fleeing—in other words, situations when obfuscation matters most. Turning to the causes of this differential obfuscation, our evidence is not consistent with either demand-side drivers or supply-side factors associated with TV station ownership and political leaning. Instead, our results point to original narratives crafted by police departments as a more likely driver of obfuscation. Our study emphasizes the importance of considering semantic language structures in understanding how media shapes perceptions, extending beyond coverage quantity and slant.

Crime news shapes public perceptions of safety, influencing decisions about where to live and how much to pay for a home—yet its impact on housing markets remains largely unexamined. This paper evaluates the effects of crime news coverage on housing prices and shows systematic gaps in crime coverage by race. I construct a novel dataset linking nearly the entire universe of gun-related homicides in the United States (2014–2018) to 1.5 million days of local TV news coverage. I find that homicides with non-white participants are significantly overrepresented in the media, even after controlling for incident, victim, suspect, and neighborhood characteristics. I then estimate the causal effect of crime news coverage on housing prices, using an instrumental variables strategy that exploits exogenous variation in coverage caused by the timing of homicides relative to local sports events. I find that housing prices decline by 8.1–8.5% following coverage of a nearby homicide. However, homicides that are not covered by the media have no detectable effect on prices. Further analysis reveals that these effects are demand-driven, with buyers responding to media portrayals of crime, while supply remains unresponsive in the short term. Finally, I calculate that racial bias in crime coverage depresses housing prices in predominantly minority neighborhoods by an additional 0.45%, exacerbating existing disparities in wealth and real estate valuations.